A beef import model is specified and estimated using disequilibrium econometrics. The statistical significance of the model suggests that disequilibrium has historically existed in the US beef import market. Surplus analysis based on the disequilibrium framework indicates that a welfare loss has been incurred as a result of the quota and associated voluntary restraint programmes that have existed in that market.
In terms of food expenditures, beef represents the single most important item in the US consumer food budget. Hence, the restrictive beef import policies of the US are controversial. Consumer groups contend that maintenance of the quota on meat imports has led to excessively high prices; producers, on the other hand, argue that unlimited imports would seriously depress the domestic cattle market. The problem takes on added significance in the light of the growing awareness on the part of consumers and consumer groups that agricultural policies designed to guarantee a market for domestic producers may seriously harm consumer interest. This general atmosphere has been reflected in such consumer actions in the US as the beef boycott of 1974. ' Several studies (Jackson 1972; Ehrich and Usman 1974; Houck 1974; Rausser and Freebairn 1974; Freebairn and Rausser 1975; Schmitz and Nelson 1977) have been undertaken to assess the effects of different import levels on domestic US producers. None of these studies, however, have attempted to analyse empirically the US beef import market in the absence of both quota and voluntary restraint regulations. In other words, the question of total deregulation of the market has not been addressed in these studies. An attempt to outline and implement a general procedure for doing t,hat is the subject of this paper. Hopefully, the procedure is sufficiently general to allow application to other regulated markets.
The recent history of the US beef import market is reviewed initially, followed by discussion of reasons why standard competitive assumptions may be inappropriate for the market under consideration. A discussion of the possible welfare effects in such a market, the empirical estimation and comments on the results complete the paper.
Background2
In 1964, after a 10-year period characterised by steadily rising imports * R. E. Just and A. Schmitz are at the University of California at Berkeley. and declining domestic cattle prices, the US Congress passed Public Law 88-482 (commonly referred to as the Meat Import Law of 1964) in response to producer pressure to regulate the imports of fresh, chilled, or frozen meat which originate primarily in Australia and New Zealand.3 Imports of these commodities were allowed to expand from a base of 725 million lbs at the same rate that domestic production of these meats had expanded from the 1959 to 1963 base period to the most recent three-year average. If projected imports exceeded the estimated quota level, as published in the US Federal Register, by more than 10 per cent (1 10 per cent of the quota is referred to as the trigger level), the President was required by the provisions of Public Law 88-482 to invoke the meat quota. However, the President also had the power to suspend the quota level if he deemed that to be in the national interest.
In the period 1965 to 1977, the provisions of Public Law 88-482 and Section 204 of the Agricultural Act of 1956, which provided the authority to negotiate and, if necessary, enforce voluntary agreements to restrict imports, had been used to keep the imports of meat products into the US at a level lower than they would have been in the absence of these barriers to trade. Because of the combination of voluntary and strict controls, however, the market for imported beef may well not have cleared (e.g. import demand exceeding import supply) during certain periods of time in an ex ante sense.
In 1979 the Meat Import Law was passed. It allows imports to run counter-cyclical to domestic production. Imports are voluntarily restricted but the negotiated levels are adjusted by both growth and counter-cyclical factors. These factors increase imports when domestic cow beef supplies are tight without compelling the suspension of quotas.
Disequilibrium in Restricted Markets
For an individual consumer, the ex ante demand for a commodity represents a schedule of desired consumption at various prices. Similarly, the ex ante supply for an entrepreneur is given by a schedule of desired quantities supplied at various prices. Ex ante supply and demand, however, may not be equal at prevailing prices. Expost demand and supply, correspond to what is actually traded in the market and are, therefore, always equal. Although ex ante demand (supply) may equal ex post demand (supply), this is not true in general.
Consider the effect of US governmental pressure on Australian and other foreign beef producers to restrain the amount supplied to the US market. It can be shown under consumer utility and producer profit maximisation, for example, that the effective or expost supply and demand curves lie everywhere to the inside of the ex ante supply and demand curves, respectively. A problem, therefore, is how to isolate the ex ante demand and supply curves from the expost relationships. Once it is established that consumers (producers) may not be operating on their ex ante demand (supply) curve, there is no reason to suspect that the market will clear in an ex ante sense.
Suppose, for example, that consumers operate on their ex ante curve Imports of goat meat and mutton are also regulated, but imports other than beef are of no practical importance and thus will not be directly considered in the ensuing analysis. but producers for some reason are forced off their ex ante curve. This is illustrated in Figure 1 where D and S represent the ex ante demand and supply curves and S' is the expost supply curve. The amount traded in the market is Q' as opposed to the ex ante equilibrium amount Q; and at the observed market price PI, there is excess supply, Q'Q'', in the ex ante market. Failure to account for such phenomena could lead to inconsistent parameter estimates in empirical work. Since demand and supply curves are best typified as 'snapshots' of a market at any point in time, there appears to be no reason to assume that the periods of time in which observations are made happen to be periods where the market clears in an ex ante sense. Indeed, the opposite seems to be the more general assumption. To quote from Hicks (1972, p. 53) :
Equality between demand and supply, in the sense of the amount bought and sold, is an identity which has nothing to do with the equilibrium assumption. Equality between amount sold and the amount which in the given circumstances sellers will want to sell is . quite a different matter.
It seems probable, therefore, that the quota and the associated voluntary restraint agreements negotiated between the US and the major beef exporters may drive a wedge between the ex ante and ex post import functions. To analyse the impact of the quota as opposed to the free-trade case, it is, therefore, necessary to identify the ex ante demand and supply relationships. The problem at hand then becomes one of identifying ex ante relationships having information only on ex post quantities.
Clearly, standard econometric techniques are not applicable.
To see the empirical problem more clearly, recall that standard econometric estimation techniques assume that observed price-quantity couples (such as P I ,Q') correspond to the intersection of the ex ante demand and supply curves. Under appropriate identifying restrictions, these observations are then used to generate estimates of the parameters of the ex ante demand and supply functions. In the case described above, however, the observed price and quantity correspond to the intersection of the expost demand and supply curves. Standard econometric techniques, therefore , will only yield estimates of the expost demand and supply curves. Welfare analysis of the effects of the restrictive import policies of the US requires a knowledge of both the ex ante and the ex post relationships. Under the reasonable assumption that the short side of the market dominates, however, estimates of ex ante demand and supply for beef can be obtained by 'disequilibrium econometrics' as explained belowe4
Welfare Eflects in a Restricted Market From a welfare standpoint, it is well known that under usual competitive conditions a quota results in a welfare gain to producers and a welfare loss to consumers. Ignoring any quota licensing fee, there is a net welfare loss to the country imposing the quota. However, when price setting occurs by a different mechanism, there is a possibility of a net welfare gain. In Figure 2 , S, is supply in the exporting country and S, is supply in the importing country; 0, is demand in the importing country. Under free trade, price is P, while OQ* is the amount imported, determined where import supply (ES) intersects import demand (ED). Suppose now that the importing country imposes a quota which restricts trade to OQ, . Under usual competitive market clearing assumptions, producers gain P p b P , , and consumers lose PlegPf as a result of the quota for a net loss in the importing country of PlcfPf.
In a situation where ex ante import demand is not assumed to equal ex ante import supply, however, the quota may lead to an opposite result. Suppose that the price charged to the importing country is Po which is also the price paid to the exporting country. The net gain for the importing country from imposition of the quota is P1cfPf-P1chPo. Since P,Podh is greater than cdf, there is a net gain from the quota. Therefore, This corresponds to :he case where the constraint binds only one side of the market.
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FIGURE 2 -Welfare measures in a disequilibrium framework.
it is to the advantage of the importing country to impose a quota in this case if it is able to purchase the quota amount at a price Po. On the other hand, the quota could work to the disadvantage of the importing country if market price PI occurs. Obviously, a determination of which market price occurs under quotas is necessary before one can determine whether or not the imposition of a quota results in a net welfare loss or gain. Disequilibrium econometrics provides a mechanism for determining whether or not one is observing PO or P1.5 Furthermore, since these welfare ambiguities only arise when ex ante import demand does not equal ex ante import supply, appropriate welfare analysis of the effects of the beef import quotas cannot, in fact, be carried out in a satisfactory manner with usual techniques; such an approach determines the qualitative results by a priori specification. That is, if supply and demand are estimated under competitive free market assumptions, then the welfare effects follow the former case above and necessarily imply a welfare loss for the importing country from imposing quotas.
A Model of Import Demand and Supply
To examine these issues empirically, a simple model of the ex ante 5Estimation, even in a disequilibrium framework, is not feasible unless observations pertain to either ex ante excess demand or ex ante excess supply. This problem is discussed further in the conclusions. import demand and import supply for beef in a two-country US and restof-the-world model is developed. The ex ante demand and supply functiOns in the importing country are represented by:
where D isdemand, S is supply, p is vector of prices, M is income, Z and H a r e vectors of shift parameters.
The corresponding ex ante import demand function is:
Similarly, the ex ante export supply function of the exporting nation is written as:
where * denotes the exporting nation. Since the prevailing market price is not determined by equilibrium in the ex ante market but is likely to be affected by the level of import demand and import supply, assume that:
ED=D(p,M,Z)-S@,H)=ED@,M,Z,H).
(4)
AP, = r(ED, -ES,).
Both ED, and ES, will not generally be observable. Only the actual quantity imported (QM,) is observed. This quantity is linked to ES, and ED, by the assumption: To implement this model empirically, a linear form is assumed for both ED, and ES,.
ED, = a1 P, + Cr'X, + u,
where X i and Z , are vectors of observations on the predetermined variables of the system at time t ; (x and P are appropriately defined parameter column vectors; and U , and V, are independent, normally distributed random disturbances with zero means and variances nI and n Z 2 , respectively.
It now remains to derive the joint density for Q, and P,. To proceed, let 9 , represent those sample observations corresponding to AP, I 0 and \k2 represent ikl's complement among the sample observations. If the tth observation belongs to \ k l , note that equation (4) can be rewritten as:
This implies that the joint density for QM, and P, can be written as: J is the Jacobian of the transformation from U, V to QA4,P A similar argument will establish that the joint density between QM and P for observations belonging to \kz can be written a s 6
The corresponding log-likelihood function for the parameters is, therefore, 
The Estimated Model
The above log-likelihood function was maximised under the assumption of normality using monthly data on the US beef import market for the period January 1974 to October 1976. The resulting estimates are:
In ED, = -4.210 -0.9737 In (HP/CPZ), +O.l974 In (PP/CP1) Based on the results, one may note that estimated own-price elasticities for ex ante import demand and supply are strikingly different from those estimated previously. For example, both the import demand and supply functions estimated by Ehrich and Usman (1974) (who investigate a structure more closely resembling the present model than other studies) are highly elastic (-2.4 and 1.5, respectively) .s This large difference in elasticities suggests that considerably different welfare effects would be suggested by allowing for the possibility that ex ante import demand might not be equal to ex ante import supply.
Implied Eflects of Beef Import Quota
The estimated ex ante import demand and supply equations can be used to approximate the level of ex ante excess demand and supply over the sample period. These results (reported in Table 1) suggest that, for the major part of the period from January 1974 to October 1976, the import market was characterised by excess supply. In the context of Figure  2 , this implies that the US suffers a welfare loss due to beef import quotas, since the price in the importing country with quotas is above the free-trade price.
To estimate further the magnitude of the welfare impacts of the quota, the estimated ex ante import demand and supply equations can be used to solve for the price and import level that would clear the ex ante market. The ex ante equilibrium import quantities and prices generated by the reduced form of the ex ante model are reported in Table 2 , along with observed imports and prices. The results indicate that, if both suppliers and demanders had been permitted to operate on their ex ante curves (i.e. the free-trade solution), the price would have been slightly (about 2 cents per lb) lower and imports would have been slightly (about 3 million Ib per month) higher on the average.
To obtain an idea of the welfare implications of this result, the import demand equation can be inverted obtaining HP, = HP(ED,, Zt) where ternational Monetary Fund (1974 Fund ( -1976 ).'
Since Australia is the single largest exporter of meat to the US, its income and exchange rate are used to represent those variables. Also, the specification of the exchange rate as a separate independent variable is discussed at length in Chambers and Just (1979) . This particular specification recognises that the responsiveness of trade flows to movements in the exchange rate need not be restricted to be identical in elasticity terms to own-price movements. The associated asymptotic f-statistic supports the specification.
It may be noted that the elasticities reported by Ehrich and Usman (1974) are based on undeflated prices, while the elasticities computed in this study are based on prices deflated by the consumer price index (to allow for substitution possibilities). Nevertheless, an examination of other than nominal elasticities should presumably not lead to such remarkable differences. sumers after accounting for the loss to producers due to increased imports and lower prices. A domestic lump-sum transfer from consumers to producers would apparently offer a better alternative for supporting the incomes of cattle producers since the US is not successful in obtaining lower import prices when import purchases are limited. Alternatively, a tariff could possibly be imposed to improve the US balance of payments at various import levels.
ConcIusions
In this paper a beef import model has been specified and estimated using disequilibrium econometrics. Surplus analysis, based on the disequilibrium framework, indicates that a welfare loss has been incurred as a result of the quota and the associated restraint program. The estimated model implies that a removal of the quota program would slightly reduce the total expenditure on beef imports while reducing price by about 2 per cent and increasing the imported quantity by about 1.9 per cent.
A possible shortcoming of this paper, which the reader should bear in mind, however, is that the econometric analysis assumes price-quantity observations lie either on the ex ante import supply or ex ante import demand curve. The possibility exists, of course, that the observed prices fall between the two curves at the import quota level, due to some kind of gamesmanship between the US and other countries in price determination. Standard equilibrium models, however, assume that price-quantity observations lie on both curves; thus, the present analysis is at least less restrictive than previous work.
